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1. Introduction 
The global economic downturn has reduced the demand for all types of energy while the 
world’s capacity to produce natural gas is surging. As a result, LNG is becoming an 
important energy source option. Large reserves of natural gas exist around the world, often 
in areas where there is no market or where the resources exceed the demand. Therefore, this 
natural gas must be shipped to areas where there is demand, and, to reduce costs, the gas is 
liquefied, reducing its volume by about 600 times. Thus, the storage and regasification 
system usually occurs in onshore plants. The LNG is stored in a double-walled storage tank 
at atmospheric pressure until needed. Then, the LNG is pumped at a higher pressure and 
warmed until it turns into gas again. 
From this viewpoint, the FSRU (Floating and Storage Regasification Unit) is becoming a new 
economic and flexible alternative for the storage and regasification system. The FSRU costs 
less than an onshore facility of similar capacity; it provides a faster return to the capital 
invested because time is saved by not having an extensive planning and permitting process 
as usually occurs with onshore developments. Moreover, construction time is reduced, 
assuming the conversion of an existing LNG carrier. Additionally, as the FSRU can be 
moved from one demand area to another, paperit is a flexible and attractive feature in 
countries with seasonal demand or where there is an unstable market. 
It is also worth noting two more FSRUs attractive features. First, an accident in one onshore 
plant might produce considerable impact on neighboring areas and on the local population 
(this risk may be even worse due to the possibility of a terrorist attack), as reported by [1, 2]. 
Second, LNG provides clean energy as compared with traditional fuels, and it is a 
significant alternative to diversify the national energy matrix.  
Because the regasification system usually occurs in onshore plants, the processing in vessels 
is pioneering. These vessels were formerly used for transporting liquefied gas and were 
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transformed into FSRUs to gasify the LNG. Therefore, the development of efficient 
technologies for LNG exploration and distribution is essential. Risk and reliability analysis 
are vital to the development of these technologies. 
As reported by [3], an increasing number of recent studies have applied BN in reliability 
analysis, risk analysis and maintenance due to the benefits that BN provides in contrast with 
traditional tools, such as its capacity for representing limited or incomplete knowledge, local 
dependencies and multi-state variables and its ability to deal with any probability density 
function. Its practicality to model common cause failures and the capability to update the 
state of knowledge according to new evidence are also important advantages that have been 
explored in reliability analysis using BN. 
This chapter proposes the construction of a BN to evaluate the reliability of the 
regasification system of a FSRU and presents additional developments over a previous 
published study [4], in which the regasification system BN, converted from a fault tree, was 
evaluated to model the probability of an undesired event. The first part of this chapter 
provides an overview of the BNs, followed by explanations of the Regasification System as 
well as the Regasification System BN. The model shown herein was built and executed 
using the commercial tool, AgenaRisk, available in [5]. In the second part of this chapter, the 
reliability of the regasification system is evaluated and information is obtained such as 
critical components and subsystems and other conditions that affect the system reliability.  
2. Bayesians networks 
As defined by [6], BN is a graphical structure for representing the probabilistic relationships 
among a large number of variables and for making probabilistic inferences with those 
variables. A BN is a direct acyclic graph (DAG) with the nodes representing the variables 
and the arcs, their conditional dependencies. The BN qualitative analysis provides the 
relationships between the nodes while the quantitative analysis may be performed in two 
ways: a predictive analysis or a diagnostic analysis. The first one calculates the probability 
of any node based on its parent nodes and the conditional dependencies. The second one 
calculates the probability of any set of variables given some evidence. 
The nodes and arcs are the qualitative components of the networks and provide a set of 
conditional independence assumptions that may be represented through a graph notion 
called d-separation, which means that each arc built from variable X to variable Y is a direct 
dependence, such as a cause-effect relationship. 
If the variables are discrete, the probabilistic relationship of each node X with their 
respective parents pa(X) is defined by its Conditional Probability Table (CPT) while for 
continuous variables, this probabilistic relationship is defined by its Conditional Probability 
Distribution (CPD), which represents conditional probability density functions. The 
quantitative analysis is based on the conditional independence assumption. Considering 
three random variables X, Y and Z, X is said to be conditionally independent of Y given Z, if 
P(X,Y│Z)=P(X│Z)P(Y│Z). The joint probability distribution of set of variables, based on 
their conditional independence, can be factorized as shown in Eq.1: 
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 Pሾxଵ, xଶ, … , x୬ሿ = ∏ Pሾx୧|Parentx୧ሿ୬୧ୀଵ  (1) 
The graphical representation is the bridging of the gap between the (high level) conditional 
independence statements that must be encoded in the model and the (low level) constraints, 
which enforce the CPD [7]. 
Given some evidence, beliefs are recalculated to indicate their impact on the network. The 
possibility of using evidences of the system to reassess the probabilities of network events is 
another important feature of the BNs; it is interesting to determine critical points in the 
system. Classical methods of inference of a BN for this purpose involve computation of the 
posterior marginal probability distribution of each component, computation of the posterior 
joint probability distribution of subsets of components and computation of the posterior 
joint probability distribution of the set of all nodes. The analysis and propagation of 
evidences allowed by BN are useful to explore or forecast some system behavior that is 
unknown or requires more attention as in [8]. In addition, the propagation of evidences 
offers the possibility to check the influence of redundant systems or critical equipment, such 
as equipment that requires a long time to repair. 
In the last years, the number of studies that presented the use of BN in reliability analysis 
have been increased [9-11]; traditional models, such as fault trees and block diagrams, have 
been replaced by discrete BN. However, to perform an efficient application of BNs in 
reliability assessment, such network models must be hybrid models formed by discrete and 
continuous variables. The evaluation of hybrid networks poses a challenge; there are 
limitations of inference algorithms, such as dealing with state space explosion and finding 
an appropriate discretization. However, a new and efficient dynamic discretization of the 
domain and an iterative approximation method which produce finer discretization in the 
regions that contribute more to the structure of the density functions associated with a 
robust propagation algorithm were proposed by [9,10]. This approach is implemented in the 
commercial BN software package, AgenaRisk [5], which is used in this study. There are 
other commercial tools for the calculation of BNs, such as [12] and [13]. [14] is an excellent 
reference for the theoretical aspects of BNs and algorithms. This approach allows the BN to 
deal with any probability distribution function, unlike the traditional tools which are 
capable of dealing only with exponential distributions. 
Another relevant BN feature is its practicality to model common cause failures; the Common 
Cause Failures (CCFs) are the failure of more than one component due to the same cause, 
which can render the redundancy protection useless significantly affecting the system 
reliability. More details about CCFs and proposed methods to deal with are reported in 
[16,17]. Including CCFs in a BN is not a complex process. If the BN is a network composed 
of only discrete variables, the CCF probabilities are included directly to the CPT, as [10] 
reports, and it is not necessary to use additional constructs such as when using fault trees. If 
the BN is a network composed of continuous variables, the CCFs are represented by 
additional nodes; one node for each group of similar components is included in the BN. The 
frequency rate of these failures is estimated according to the redundant components; [16, 17] 
explain the methods for obtaining these rates. 
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It is also worth noting that BNs are efficient to model multi-state variables, local 
dependencies and limited or incomplete knowledge. Multi-state variables and local 
dependencies are important to build a more realistic model; traditional tools usually use just 
binary variables and are unable to represent local dependencies, for example to represent 
how a malfunction of the equipment affects other equipment. Occasionally, there are not 
enough or satisfactory statistical data about the system to perform the reliability analysis; in 
this situation, BN builders ask relevant questions to a group of specialists and explain the 
assumptions that are encoded in the model, and the domain experts supply their knowledge 
to the BN builders ([18]and [19] demonstrated this process).  
The reliability analysis presented in this chapter explores the benefits of BN use, such as the 
inclusion of CCFs, modeling with continuous variables, propagation of evidence and local 
dependences representation. 
3. Methodology 
The proposed methodology is a combination of different techniques already used. Proposals 
of different authors and several techniques were combined to compose the methodology, 
which resulted in the formation of a four-step methodology: familiarization, qualitative 
analysis, quantitative analysis and complementary analysis. 
In the first step, familiarization, all the information available about the system and the 
operation must be collected. The second step, qualitative analysis, is the step at which the 
relationship among the system components must be identified and, as a result, a BN is built 
to represent the system. Next, in the quantitative analysis, the priori probabilities of root 
nodes and the conditional probabilities tables for non-root nodes are defined allowing the 
evaluation of the joint probability of a set of variables. Finally, the complementary analyses 
must be performed by evaluating the posterior probabilities:  criticality analysis, the analysis 
of different scenarios of interest and the conditional reliability analysis. These analyses allow 
improving the reliability analysis through an evaluation that is not possible through 
traditional tools. The criticality analysis means to find the set of components or subsystems 
that have greater influence in the system behavior; the analysis of different scenarios can be 
used to model any situation of interest, such as the impact of including redundancies, the 
impact of a component fault or any other condition that affects the system reliability; and 
the conditional reliability analysis provides information about the system behavior over 
time. Figure 1 presents an overview of the methodology steps; the figure is divided into two 
parts: the first in which all the tasks to be performed at each step are listed and the second 
which lists the means suggested for these tasks. 
4. Application 
In this section, the reliability analysis of the regasification system is performed by using the 
methodology of the previous section. First, the information collected about the system is 
presented. Then, the qualitative analysis is performed. Subsequently, a quantitative analysis  
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Figure 1. Methodology 
will be conducted, in which the failure probability density and the system reliability are 
estimated for a given mission time of the system. And finally, the complementary analysis is 
presented. The AgenaRisk (Desktop Agena Risk, 2011)[5] was used to build the Bayesian 
Network and to make the inferences about the system. 
4.1. Familiarization - The regasification system 
Usually, vessels are used for LNG transportation; however, in the last years, these vessels 
also began to participate in gas regasification and directly supply net pipes. The 
regasification process onboard adds new hazards to the operations of LNG vessels, because 
in addition to LNG, there is now compressed gas in the process. Accidents in this process 
may reach the storage tanks, causing very severe consequences.  
In the vessel studied, a cascade system was used to regasify the LNG. In this system, the LNG 
is heated in two stages. In the first, it is heated by a propane compact heat exchanger (HE1), 
and its temperature increases from -162ºC to -10ºC; at this stage, the natural gas is already 
vaporized, but this temperature is too low for delivery to the pipeline, where the heating  
process would continue. In the next stage, the gas is heated by seawater in a shell-and-tube 
heat exchanger (HE2), and the temperature reaches 15ºC. The first stage uses no water due to 
the possibility of water freezing in direct contact with LNG. The propane used in the first 
phase works in a closed loop. When the propane leaves the LNG heat exchanger HE1, its 
temperature is approximately -5ºC, and it is liquefied (propane at 4.7 bar liquefies at 
approximately -5ºC); hence, it is pumped into a titanium heat exchanger (HE3) and heated, by 
sea water, up to 0ºC at 4.7 bar and vaporizes. It then returns to the LNG exchanger HE1. This 
system must have an effective thermal insulation to avoid an unexpected heat gain of the LNG 
or propane inside the tubing, which could result in a gas expansion and possibly cause a 
tubing rupture. A more detailed description of the regasification system is given in [4]. A 
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diagram of the system is shown in Figure 1, and the nomenclature used is presented in Table 1. 
The thermal insulation for each heat exchanger will also be considered (I1, I2 and I3).  
 
Figure 2. Regasification system 
 
Item Description Item Description 
T1 LNG tank P2, P3 Propane pumps 
T2 Propane tank P4, P5 Water pumps 
V1, V2, V3, V6, V8, V9, 
V10, V11, V12, V13 
Gate valves for liquid 
Pipes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 12 
Pipes with less than 10'' 
V4, V5, V7 Gate valves for gas Delivery Pipe Pipe with 12'' 
P1 LNG supply pump Ac1 Propane accumulator 
F1 LNG filter F2 Propane filter 
Ac2 LNG accumulator HE2 
Sea water/LNG shell&tube 
heat exchanger 
HE1 
Propane/LNG compact 
heat exchanger 
HE3 
Propane/sea water 
titanium heat exchanger 
C Compressor F3 e F4 Water filter 
Table 1. Nomenclatures 
4.2. Qualitative analysis  
Qualitative analysis should provide a clear view of the system and the relationships 
between system elements; this representation may be produced by building a block diagram 
or a fault tree and then converting it into BN, as presented by [4] and [11] or may be directly 
produced from the system analysis.  
The regasification system was represented in a hybrid BN. Continuous nodes were built to 
represent the time to failure (TTF) of the basic components and subsystems, and discrete 
nodes to represent the state of the system or subsystem.  
Another important BN feature is its capability of modeling local dependences. The 
regasification system has local dependences between heat exchangers and insulators; the 
failure probability distributions of the nodes “Heat Exchanger LNG/Propane” (HE1), “Heat 
Exchanger LNG/Water” (HE2) and “Heat Exchanger Propane/Water” (HE3) change if the 
insulation fails. If the insulation fails, the heat exchanger failure probability increases. This 
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variable has a conditional dependence that is not possible to address with traditional 
approaches such as Fault Trees (FT). In FT analysis, it is not possible represent local 
dependence, but it can be modeled in a simple way with BNs. To include this dependence in 
the model, an arc was built between these nodes (Figure 3). With this approach, it is possible 
to model how the malfunction of any equipment affects other equipment.  
 
Figure 3. Conditional dependences 
Finally, to complete the qualitative analysis, the CCF must be included. This system has a 
redundant subsystem in which a CCF may occur; a parallel system provides water for heat 
exchangers HE2 and HE3. The CCFs are important contributors to system unreliability and 
typically exist among redundant units. A CCF in this subsystem directly affects the 
reliability of the whole system. In the BN, one node is included for each group of redundant 
components to verify the CCF effects; each node is a representation of the CCF associated 
with groups of similar equipment: CCF1 (valves), CCF2 (filters) and CCF3 (pumps). 
The Regasification System BN is illustrated in Figure 4; the top node represents the whole 
regasification system. Below are the subsystems and even the basic components and the 
CCFs are highlighted. Also, there is node “R” which is the reliability node; it will be used to 
evaluate the system reliability for a specific mission time. 
4.3. Quantitative analysis  
Quantitative analysis begins with the inclusion in the BN of the priori probabilities of root 
nodes; these probabilities can be provided by statistical data or be estimated by experts. 
Next, the relationships between nodes must be specified. And finally the joint probability of 
the network is obtained, which, in the case study will serve to obtain the system reliability 
for a given mission time. The root nodes that represent the basic components are completed 
by probability density functions representing the TTF of each basic component.  
The relationships between components are represented by basic constructs, such as the 
AND and OR gates, used in fault trees. The AND gate, where the output will fail when all 
input components fail, has a probability of failure of its output in the time interval [0,t], 
given by: P(ζ୅୬ୢ ≤ t) = P(ζଵ ≤ t,… , ζ୬ ≤ t) = P(maxሼζ୧ሽ ≤ t)									 
Where ζAnd: time to failure of AND gate 
 ζi:  time to failure of component i 
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Figure 4. Regasification system BN 
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The OR gate, where the output will fail if at least one input component fails, has a 
probability of failure of its output, in the time interval [0,t], given by: P(ζ୓ୖ ≤ t) = 1 − P(ζଵ > ݐ,… , ζ୬ > ݐ) = P(minሼζ୧ሽ ≤ t)	) 
where 
 ζOR: time to failure of OR gate 
 ζi: time to failure of component i 
Although BN is able to deal with any kind of prior distribution, the components were 
considered to have constant failure rates (λ) which means that the time-to-failure 
distributions were assumed to be exponential. Thus, the probability of a component to fail at 
time T within a given mission time t is calculated as P(T<t)) = 1-e-λt, except for the insulation. 
Statistical data about the probability of the insulation failure were not found along this 
investigation, but these distributions may be estimated by expert judgment. BN builders ask 
relevant questions to a group of specialists and explain the assumptions that are encoded in 
the model, and the domain experts supply their knowledge to the BN builders. [18,19] 
demonstrated this process. In the current study, for the insulator node, the failure 
distribution was assumed to be a Weibull distribution with shape factor s = 6 and inverse 
scale β = 1/10000. It is worth noting that any distribution can be used in the BN, which is 
another benefit that BNs offer over those of traditional tools. The failure rates (provided by 
[20] and [21] are listed in Table 2).  
 
Component 
Failure rate 
(λ) 
(hr-1) 
Component 
Failure rate 
(λ) 
(hr-1) 
C 1.709x10-4 T2 2.883x10-5 
P1 4.801x10-5 Ac1 2.883x10-5 
P2, P3 4.801x10-5 Ac2 2.883x10-5 
HE1 3.857x10-5 P4, P5 5.120x10-6 
HE3 2.175x10-5 
V1, V2, V3, V6, V8, V9, V10, V11, V12, 
V13 
6.610X10-6 
Pipes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
6.700x10-9 HE2 2.739X10-5 
Delivery pipe 6.300x10-9 T1 2.523X10-5 
V4, V5, V7 1.517x10-5 Filters 1,2,3,4 4.155X10-7 
Table 2. Failure rates 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are local dependencies between the heat 
exchangers and insulation. In order to model these dependencies, the failure rates of the 
heat exchangers were adjusted: the first considers the failure rate of the exchanger in the 
case the insulation works and the second considers a failure rate higher for the heat 
exchanger if the insulation fails. Thus, for heat exchanger HE1, the failure rate increases 
from 3,857x10-5 to 4,000x10-5 when the insulation fails, and similarly for the other two heat 
exchangers, these failure rates are in Table 3. 
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State of insulation 
Failure rate (λ)
(hr-1) 
I1 HE1
Ok 3,857x10-5 
Fault 4,000x10-5 
I2 HE2 
Ok 2,739x10-5 
Fault 3,700x10-5 
I3 HE3 
Ok 2,175 x10-5 
Fault 3,000x10-5 
Table 3. Conditional dependences 
Finally, to complete, the BN are included the CCF frequency rate; this was calculated using 
the Beta Factor Model, which was presented by [16] , and the factor beta was assumed to be 
β = 0.1, as recommended by [17]. These frequency rates are in Table 4. 
The use of BN allowed the inclusion of CCFs in the model despite the use of continuous 
variables, which is not possible with traditional tools such as fault trees and diagram blocks. 
 
 CCF Groups 
λ groupࣅࢍ = ࢼࣅࢉ 
1 Valves 6.610 x10-7 
2 Water pumps 5.120 x10-7 
3 Water filters 0.416x10-7 
Table 4. CCF Groups 
The BN was evaluated at a mission time t = 96 hours, which is the time required to regasify 
all of the stored gas in the vessel. The inference of this BN, with all parameters, allows 
obtaining the prior probability for node R (which represents the Regasification System 
Reliability at a mission time), and, for a mission time 96 h, R = 0.93873. The prior reliability 
system is the first information provided by the BN; however, the BN may provide many 
more data, and it allows several analyses concerning the system behavior.  
4.4. Complementary analyses  
4.4.1. Criticality analysis 
The criticality analysis allows verifying which component or subsystem causes the most 
impact at the reliability system by evaluating the posterior probabilities. In this chapter, the 
first criticality analysis performed concerned the impact of each subsystem on the system 
reliability.  
The graph in Figure 5 is a visual perspective, where the length of the bars is a measure of the 
impact of each node on the target node (the TTF of the Regasification System). The first bar 
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indicates the range between the lowest and the highest value for the expected TTF to the 
regasification system given the LNG/Propane subsystem. The initial point of the bar (equal 
to 0.5) is the expected value for the regasification system TTF given the LNG/Propane 
subsystem’s TTF being nearly zero. The end point (equal to 2569) is the expected value of 
the regasification system TTF given the LNG/Propane subsystem’s TTF significantly exceeds 
the mission time, which influences the regasification system TTF. After this point, the 
regasification system TTF stabilizes. Even if the LNG/Propane subsystem’s TTF increases, 
the regasification system TTF does not change. The second bar represents the expected 
values for the regasification system’s TTF conditioned on the Compression subsystem’s TTF. 
The Compression subsystem TTF begins to influence the regasification system TTF when the 
expected TTF of the regasification system is around 0.5 and this influence ends at the point 
that the expected regasification system´s TTF is 2427. The next bars are plotted using the 
same concept. 
The graph shows that the most critical subsystem is the LNG/Propane subsystem, which has 
the most significant influence on the regasification system TTF, and, as expected, the 
subsystems that have minor influence on reliability are those that are redundant: the water 
subsystem. 
This analysis may also be performed to find critical components; it is an effective tool to 
search critical points in the system, which contributes to map equipment and subsystems 
that require improvement and special attention in the maintenance plan. Once seen that the 
critical subsystem is the LNG/Propane subsystem, the criticality analysis of this subsystem 
can be performed; this analysis shows that the critical components of the LNG/Propane 
subsystem are pumps P2 and P3.  
In this study, a diagnosis analysis was also performed: given the evidence that the 
regasification system failed, which component is likely to cause the fault. The failure 
evidence is included in BN and the beliefs are recalculated. The graph in Figure 6 is the 
visual perspective where the length of the bars is a measure of the impact of each 
component on the Regasification system TTF given the evidence “fault of the system”. As 
can be seen, the compressor is the component that has the most influence on the 
Regasification System TTF given the fault system.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Criticality of the subsystems 
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Figure 6. Impact of each component on the Regasification system TTF given the fault system  
4.4.2. Analysis under different scenarios 
BN allows the study of the evidence propagation and this way the study of different 
scenarios by evaluating the posterior marginal probability distribution.  
Assuming that there is interest in improving the reliability of the regasification system, it is 
reasonable to consider improving the reliability of the most critical subsystem, but there is 
generally an associated cost. Thus, the BN can be used to verify the change in the system 
reliability due to the improvement of the critical component or subsystem. It is only 
necessary to include the evidence in the model to perform this analysis. In other words, a 
scenario is created by assuming that the LNG/Propane subsystem does not fail during the 
mission time, and then the beliefs are recalculated given this evidence. Thus, it is possible to 
see the reliability of the system improve from R = 0.93873 to R= 0.96143. This is the greatest 
possible improvement in the system reliability acting on this subsystem (LNG/Propane 
subsystem). As mentioned in item 4.4.1, the critical components of this subsystem are 
pumps P2 and P3; thus, a scenario is created in which the evidence that these two pumps 
will not fail at mission time is included; the beliefs are recalculated to verify the 
improvement that can be reached by improvements in the reliability pumps. The greatest 
possible improvement in the system reliability acting on pumps P2 and P3 made the 
reliability system increase from 0.93873 to 0.94735. 
Another issue is to improve the system reliability by adding a redundancy; in our case, for 
example, a redundant compressor, once this is the critical component given the fault system. 
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However, this action also incurs costs; thus, it is necessary to know the real effect of adding 
this redundancy. A BN is an effective way to model the appropriateness of adding a 
redundancy. A new node that represents the redundant compressor was included in the BN, 
and then the beliefs were recalculated to indicate the impact on the system reliability. For 
the system presented here, the reliability increased from R = 0.93873 to R = 0.95721. The 
same analysis may be performed to calculate the effects of a redundant compression 
subsystem in addition to a redundant component. 
The evaluation of the real effects of a redundancy inclusion on the system is essential in 
decision making process about resources and tasks to improve the reliability system. A BN 
allows performing this analysis using a simple method. 
4.4.3. Conditional reliability 
The failure rates of the equipment with exponential failure distributions are constant; 
however, the failure rates of the equipment that have a different distribution modify over 
time; subsequently, the reliability is modified. The BN allows including a different previous 
operation time for each component by the inclusion of a node that indicates if a components 
has a previous operation time. Then, the beliefs are recalculated and the posterior 
probabilities are evaluated given this evidence. 
As an application, a previous operation time of 1000 hours was included as evidence to the 
insulators, which have a Weibull distribution. Figure 5 shows a partial view of the system BN, 
in which the extra node which indicates if there is a previous operation time can be seen. In 
blue, the posterior probabilities given a previous operation time are illustrated, and in green, a 
new component is illustrated, without a previous operation time. It is possible to simulate 
different previous operation times for each equipment. For a mission time 96h, the failure 
probability of the insulator increases from 9.499x10-13 to 5.094x10-5 and the reliability system 
decreases from 0.93873 to 0.93859. This analysis allows checking the conditional reliability for 
any component operation time and, therefore, to know the reliability over time. 
 
Figure 7. Conditional Reliability 
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5. Conclusions 
It is essential to get more information about the system to make the analysis more efficient; 
however, based on the available data, the BN analysis shows that the LNG/Propane 
subsystem is the subsystem that caused the greatest impact on the reliability of the 
regasification system. Thus, the maintenance plan should pay special attention to this 
subsystem and consider the inclusion of a redundant subsystem, once that subsystem 
reliability may increase the regasification system reliability by more than 2%; a redundant 
subsystem is reasonable and not only the improvement of the critical components of this 
subsystem (P2 and P3), once they may improve the reliability system by less than 1%. The 
maintenance plan must pay special attention to the compressor, too, once this is the most 
critical component of the system given the evidence: system fault. The scenarios analyzed 
here are only a few examples; many others scenarios can be simulated using the BN 
capability to model several scenarios, according to the evidences.  
The conditional reliability analysis shows that a significant change may occur in the failure 
probabilities components which do not have exponential distributions. Thus, it is 
recommendable to perform a detailed study about the failure distribution of each 
equipment, and then assess the conditional reliability behavior.  
It is possible to model different scenarios, such as improvements in critical components, the 
impact of common cause failures, the impact of including redundancies and any other 
condition that affects the system reliability. 
This chapter described the basic configuration of the regasification system on board a FSRU, 
evaluated the assessment of its reliability using the proposed methodology allowing to 
obtain detailed results for the mission time, in addition to permitting to consider some 
possible scenarios that led to the identification of critical points and considering possible 
improvements to the system reliability. Besides the evaluation system regasification, this 
chapter also highlights the potential of BN for the improvement of reliability studies. 
In future work, the reliability analysis applied in this study may be expanded to the entire 
FSRU. In addition, a study about the system dependability may be performed; yet, to 
perform this study, the assessment of the maintenance process will be necessary. Also, the 
impact of a failure in this system may reach other areas of the vessel, such as the LNG tanks, 
which can lead to severe consequences. Therefore, future work may also focus on 
performing a risk analysis of the FSRU. 
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